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Abstract  
We investigate the hypothesis that workers in foreign-owned establishments face greater job 
insecurity.  Using linked employer employee data from Germany, we examine whether 
foreign-owned establishments are more likely to exit production, and whether workers in 
foreign-owned establishments face higher separation rates, net of establishment exit.  We find 
that, after controlling for the different characteristics of foreign and domestic establishments, 
foreign establishments have higher exit rates and higher separation rates, but the effect is 
quantitatively small.  In contrast, foreign-owned establishments which do not export appear to 
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One often hears claims that the labour market has become more insecure.  It has been suggested, for 
example, that instead of a “job for life”, workers face the prospect of having a string of short-lived jobs 
over the course of their careers.  One possible explanation for this reduction in job security is the 
increasing importance of foreign-owned firms in OECD labour markets. 
 
For example, it has been argued that employment in foreign-owned firms is more volatile than 
employment in domestic firms because foreign-owned firms have more flexibility in choosing where to 
locate production.  If a firm has production plants in Germany and China, an increase in the costs of 
production in Germany might cause the firm to lay off workers in the UK and expand production 
abroad.  In the extreme case, a multinational might actually shut-down an entire plant in one country.  If 
this were the case, we would find that (a) foreign-owned plants are more likely to close and (b) jobs in 
foreign-owned plants are more likely to end. 
 
In this paper we investigate both these issues.  We follow a large sample of plants in West Germany 
from 2000 until 2005.  We also follow the workers in those plants over the same period.  We measure 
the probability that plants shut down, and the probability that workers leave their jobs. 
 
We find that foreign-owned plants actually have lower closure rates, and lower job separation rates.  
But this is partly because foreign-owned plants are larger and more profitable.  When we compare 
plants of equal size and profitability, we find that foreign-owned plants have slightly higher closure and 
job separation rates.  However, the effect is very small, and does not seem to justify growing fears that 
globalisation makes the labour market a more insecure environment. 
 
 1 Introduction
Scheve & Slaughter (2004) argue that “foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises
is the key aspect of [international] integration generating risk.” Essentially, employment in
foreign-owned ﬁrms is thought to be more volatile because foreign-owned ﬁrms can more
easily shift production between locations. A related argument is made by G¨ org & Strobl
(2003), who shows that foreign-owned plants are more likely to exit the market than similar
domestically-owned ﬁrms.
Employment volatility and plant exit inevitably cause worker turnover. Workers who lose
their jobs in foreign-owned plants are forced to move to other plants, many of which will be
domestically-owned. Aseparateliteraturehassuggestedthatsuchworkerturnovercanbeneﬁt
the host economy, because human capital gained in the foreign-owned ﬁrm is transferred to
domestic ﬁrms. For example, Blomstrom & Kokko (2003) suggest that the movement of
workers is an important channel by which productivity “spillovers” occur. However, as noted
by Fosfuri, Motta & Ronde (2001), evidence on spilloversdue to workers’ mobility is “scarce
and far from conclusive.”
In this paper we investigate both these issues. Using data from a large survey of German
establishments linked to the workers in those plants, we examine: ﬁrst, whether foreign-
owned establishments are more likely to exit; second, whether workers in foreign-owned
establishments have higher separation rates.
We ﬁnd that, after controlling for the different characteristics of foreign and domestic estab-
lishments, foreign establishments have higher exit rates and higher separation rates, but the
effect is quantitatively small. In contrast, foreign-owned establishments which do not export
appear to have considerably higher exit rates and separation rates.
In Section 2 we discuss the related literature in more detail, and explain how our data and
methods contribute. In Section 3 we describe the data and how we construct our measures of
establishment exit and worker turnover. The econometric method we use for both measures
is discussed in Section 4. Our results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
12 Previous literature
2.1 Foreign ownership and plant exit
There is a substantial literature on the determinants of ﬁrm (or establishment) success and
failure, where failure is deﬁned in terms of exit from the market. Various theoretical mod-
els suggest that larger ﬁrms and older ﬁrms will have lower hazard rates (Jovanovic 1982,
Hopenhayn 1992), and this is largely borne out in the empirical ﬁndings.
Early studies by Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson (1988, 1989) provide descriptive evidence on
the proportion of plants which exit over a ﬁve year period as a function of their industry and
size. They ﬁnd that failure rates decline with current size and the age of the plant. Studies
such as Wagner (1994), Mata & Portugal (1994), Audretsch & Mahmood (1995) and Disney,
Haskel & Heden (2003) have used duration models to estimate the probability of plant exit
per period conditional on survival up to that period. The failure rate of ﬁrms is found to
be declining in duration (new ﬁrms are most likely to fail). Important explanatory variables
for exit include size, whether the ﬁrm has multiple plants and various measures of market
structure (such as industry concentration).
Asmallnumberofstudieshaveincludedthenationalityofownershipasaregressorinamodel
of exit. G¨ org & Strobl (2003) ﬁnd that manufacturing plants in Ireland which are owned by
foreign multinationals actually have lower exit rates. However, this does not account for the
fact that foreign-owned plants have characteristics typically associated with lower exit rates.
For example, foreign-owned plants tend to be larger. Once these factors are accounted for,
G¨ org & Strobl ﬁnd that foreign-owned plants have higher exit rates.
Bernard & Sj¨ oholm (2003) ﬁnd similar results for a sample of plants in Indonesia. In the
raw data, foreign-owned plants are far less likely to shut down than domestic plants. Once
again, however, this is because foreign-owned plants tend to be larger and more productive.
Controlling for plant size and productivity, foreign-owned plants are signiﬁcantly more likely
to close than domestic plants.
These results are also conﬁrmed by Bernard & Jensen (2007) for the U.S. Plants which are
part of multinational enterprises have lower exit rates, but tend to be larger, older and more
productive. Once these characteristics are taken into account, plants belonging to multina-
tionals have higher exit rates.
Alvarez& G¨ org (2005)useplant-leveldatafor Chile, and ﬁnd that although foreign plants are
more likely to exit, controlling for other ﬁrm and industry characteristics, it is only domestic
2market oriented multinationals which are more “footloose”. Foreign-owned plants which
export do not have higher exit rates.
An important question raised by these studies is the extent to which the characteristics of
foreign-owned plants which are associated with lower exit rates (e.g. size and productivity)
are the result of an earlier change of ownership, or whether multinationals simply takeover
plants which already had these characteristics. Clearly, the beneﬁts of foreign ownership to
the domestic economy depends very much on which of these is the more important.
Allofthesestudiesuseﬁrm-orplant-leveldata, andtherefore arenotabletoexaminewhether
the characteristics of a ﬁrm’s workforce are important determinants of exit. One contribution
we are able to make by using linked worker-ﬁrm data is to include detailed measures of the
ﬁrm’s human capital in the exit equation.1
2.2 Foreign ownership and worker turnover
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies which use individual-level data on worker
separation rates to examine whether turnover is higher in foreign-owned establishments.
There is, however, a large literature which examines the determinants of worker separation
rates more generally. Two important theoretical frameworks are the job matching literature
(e.g. Jovanovic (1979)) and the literature on ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, which dates back at
least to Becker (1962). Both of these frameworks predict that the probability of separating
declines with job tenure, although for different reasons. This prediction is consistently borne
out by the empirical evidence, see for example Anderson & Meyer (1994, Table 7).
There is also a recent theoretical literature on human capital spillovers between foreign and
domestic ﬁrms. Human capital spillovers can be deﬁned as those spillovers which occur
because of training of workers in foreign-owned plants, and the subsequent movement of
workers between plants. In addition Blomstrom & Kokko (2003) notes that beneﬁciaries
might also include employees of suppliers, subcontractors and customers of MNCs.
Fosfuri et al. (2001) study the theoretical conditions under which spillovers occur. Spillovers
occur when foreign-owned plants train workers who later join domestic plants. But they note
that “...evidence on spillovers due to workers’ mobility is scarce and far from conclusive.”
Glass & Saggi (2002) develop a model in which foreign-owned ﬁrms offer higher wages
to prevent turnover. They argue therefore that turnover (and hence economic insecurity)
1Abowd, McKinney & Vilhuber (2007) is another recent paper which uses linked employer-employee data
to relate the probability of plant exit to the human capital of its workforce.
3will be lower in foreign-owned plants. There is also some evidence from case studies in
developing countries (Gershenberg 1987) that foreign-owned ﬁrms offer more training to
technical workers and managers than local ﬁrms, and that the mobility of managers in these
plants is actually much lower, reducing the potential for spillovers.
One of the few papers to (even indirectly) estimate the extent to which worker mobility con-
tributes to the productivity of domestic ﬁrms is G¨ org & Strobl (2005). Using data from a
sample of manufacturing ﬁrms in Ghana, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms whose entrepreneur previously
worked in multinationals in the same industry are more productive than other domestic ﬁrms.
In contrast, however, there is also a distinct literature which suggests that the actions of multi-
national ﬁrms may be associated with greater job turnover. As noted, Scheve & Slaughter
(2004) provide some general evidence that foreign direct investment activity (both inward
and outward) is positively associated with workers’ perceived job insecurity.
Fabbri, Haskel & Slaughter (2003) argue that multinational ﬁrms have more elastic labor de-
mands than domestic ﬁrms, which would be consistent with higher worker turnover rates.
They present industry-level evidence for the U.K. and U.S. which shows that the labor de-
mand elasticity for unskilled workers has increased over a period in which multinational
activity has also expanded. Firm-level evidence is provided by Navaretti, Turrini & Checchi
(2003), who estimate dynamic labour demand equations across 11 European countries. They
showthat althoughforeign-owned ﬁrms adjust labourfaster than domesticﬁrms, the totalsize
of the adjustment is actually smaller. This may however, reﬂect the fact that foreign-owned
ﬁrms have a more skilled labour force, and hence a lower labour demand elasticity.
Our contribution is to examine whether individual workers in foreign-owned ﬁrms are ac-
tually more “insecure” than similar workers in domestic ﬁrms. This is important because
it relates both to whether human capital spillovers are an important feature of multinational
activity, and to whether multinational ﬁrms contribute to greater economic insecurity.
3 Data description
There are two data sources. The ﬁrst is the Institut f¨ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
(IAB) Establishment Panel, an annual survey of approximately 8,250 plants located in the
former West Germany and an additional 7,900 plants in the former East Germany. The survey
started in 1993 and is ongoing. It covers 1% of all plants and 7% of all employment in
Germany, and is therefore a sample weighted toward larger plants. Information is obtained by
4personalinterviewswithplantmanagers, andcomprisesabout80questionsperyear, givingus
information on, for example, total employment, bargaining arrangements, total sales, exports,
investment,wage bill, location, industry,proﬁt level and nationalityof ownership. Ownership
is deﬁned as either West German, East German, foreign, or public.2 Complete information
on plant ownership is available for all plants only in 2000 and 2004. Plants which enter
the sample between 2000 and 2004 also have information on plant ownership recorded. A
detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel can be found in K¨ olling (2000).
The second source of data is the employment statistics register of the German Federal Ofﬁce
of Labour (Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik or BS), which covers all workers or trainees registered by
the social insurance system. The register covers about 80% of workers in West Germany and
about 85% in East Germany. Information on workers includes basic demographics, start and
end dates of employment spells, occupation and industry, earnings, qualiﬁcations (school and
post-school), and a plant identiﬁcation number. A detailed description of the employment
data can be found in Bender, Haas & Klose (2000).
We restrict the analysis to plants in the private sector. Almost all workers in the private sector
will be covered by the social insurancesystem, so we would expect that the linked data covers
nearly 100% of workers.
By using the plant identiﬁcation number we can associate (or ‘link’) each worker with a
plant in the panel. We therefore observe almost all workers in about 14,000 plants each year.
Because the employment register is spell-based (one record for each employment spell), the
combined data is potentially complex. To simplify, we select all workers in the employment
register who are employed by the surveyed plants on June 30th each year. This yields an
unbalanced annual panel of workers together with detailed information on the plants in which
they work. We refer to the linked data as the Linked IAB Panel, or LIAB; the data discussed
below is our regression sample and not the LIAB in general.3
Figure 1 presents a stylised picture of the data. It shows four plants, and some workers in
each plant.
2The relevant question is: “Is the establishment mainly or solely in: (a) West German ownership (b) East
German ownership (c) Foreign ownership (d) Public ownership (e) No single owner which holds majority?”
Our analysis considers only plants under (a)-(c).
3In this draft, we only analyse West German plants.
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a = 3, a = 4, c = 1
a = 3, a = 6, c = 0
a = 2, a = 5, c = 0
a = 1, a = 1, c = 1
a = 1, a = 3, c = 1




a = 2, a = 6, c = 0
a = 1, a = 2, c = 1
a = 1, a = 5, c = 1
Plant 3 (workers not shown) a = 3, a = 6, c = 0
Plant 4 (workers not shown) a = 4, a = 5, c = 1
Figure 1: Structure of the data
3.1 Plants
In the regression sample, plants can either shut-down (or “close”) or be right-censored by
the end of sample (30/6/2005). By construction, there is no attrition (another form of right-
censoring) in that no plants leave the sample before 30/6/2005. In Figure 1, Plants 1 and 4
close whereas Plants 2 and 3 are right-censored on 30/6/2005.
We ensure that there is no attrition from the sample by making use of the linked data. When
a plant attrits from the IAB panel we search the BS to ﬁnd out if it is still employing any
workers. A plant which attrits is thus followed until it stops employing any workers in the
BS, or until 30/6/2005, when it is censored. This is potentially important, because it seems
likely that attrition from the IAB panel is non-random with respect to the durations of interest
6i.e. plant closure and worker separations.
It is the duration to plant closure that we seek to model in this paper (together with worker
separations, discussed below). However, identifying such plants is not straightforward. In
administrative databases it is usual to assume that a plant (or a ﬁrm) has closed when its
identiﬁcation number disappears from the data. But this is problematic because plants may
change their identiﬁcation number while remaining in production. This may occur because
of some re-organisation, perhaps because plants are sold from one ﬁrm to another. However,
because our data are a combination of a detailed plant-level survey and an administrative
population, we can be more precise about the deﬁnition of plant closure.
There are two pieces of information which are informative regarding plant closure. The ﬁrst
is whether or not the plant identiﬁcation number remains in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik. The
second is the interview outcome from the IAB panel. The interview outcome essentiallytakes
three values: (1) “Same plant as last year” (2) “Plant still exists but has left panel” (3) “Plant
has closed”.
If the interview outcome indicates that the plant has closed (3), we assume that the plant has
genuinelyclosed whether or nota plant with thesame identiﬁcationnumbercontinuesto exist
in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik. Similarly, if the interview outcome indicates the “same plant as
last year” (1), we assume that the plant has not closed even if the plant identiﬁcation number
disappears from the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik. The third possibility is that the plant still exists
but has left the panel (2); here we are forced to use the existence of the plant identiﬁcation
number to determine whether the plant has closed or not. The dummy variable cj takes the
value 1 if the plant closes during the sample period and 0 otherwise. We also denote the
age at which it exits the data as aj, the integer value observed on the preceeding June 30th.
In the ﬁgure, Plant 1 closes between 30/6/2003 and 30/6/2004; Plant 2 is right-censored on
30/6/2005.
Plants can either be observed on 30/6/2000 (e.g. Plants 1 and 2) or they enter the data after-
wards (e.g. Plants 3 and 4). The IAB increased the sample size considerably over time, so for
many plants the observation period starts after 30/6/2000.
The age of a plant is calculated by ﬁnding the year in which the plant ﬁrst appears in the
Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik.4 We denote the age (or elapsed duration) at which the plant enters the
sample as aj. Most plants are born some time before the start of the sample period, and for
these plants aj > 1 when they are ﬁrst observed. Thus we have left-censoring or late entry.
4The earliest year in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik is 1977, and so age will be underestimated.
7Figure 2 clariﬁes exactly how completed duration is measured. Plant 1 is born at some point
between 1/7/1997 and 30/6/1998. It is sampled in the IAB panel on 30/6/2000, at which
point its age (elapsed duration) is between 2 and 3 years, which is rounded up to the nearest
integer (a1 = 3). The plant closes (c1 = 1) at some point between 1/7/2003 and 30/6/2004,
so the last observation of the plant is on 30/6/2003 when its completed duration is a1 = 6.
The corresponding data for the other three plants are given in Figure 1. For Plant 2, it is
(a2 = 2,a2 = 6,c2 = 0). Plant 3 is different, in that it enters the data on 30/6/2001. It was
born between 1/7/1998 and 30/6/1999 and so its age on entering the sample is a3 = 3. It is
right-censored (c3 = 0) at the end of the sample, which means that its completed duration is
a3 = 6. The corresponding data for Plant 4 is (a4 = 4,a4 = 5,c4 = 1).
t =
30th June





3 4 5 6
0 0 0 1
Figure 2: Deﬁnition of elapsed duration
Table 1 shows the basic movement of plants in and out of the sample. The number of plants
that enter the panel each year is much bigger than the number that leave it. The total number
of entrants is 3,378 whereas the number of closures is 1,399. As noted, the sample grows
over time. When the 1,399 closures is divided by 31,855 plant-years at risk, this gives a raw
hazard to closure of 0.0439. In other words, on average, of all plants alive at a certain date,
within a year 4.4% of them will have closed. 1/0.0439 gives a mean completed duration of
22.8 years: this is measured from entry into the panel.
TABLE 1 HERE
There are 4,209 plants sampled on 30/6/2000 and another 4,738 enter afterwards. Mean com-
pleted duration can be computed for the last year in which these 8,947 plants are observed: it
is 14.9 years for those that close and 17.6 for those who do not.5
5As noted earlier, this will be an underestimate because some plants are born before the start of the Besch¨ af-
tigtenstatistik.
83.2 Workers
For each plant j we observe all workers i = 1,...,Nj who are in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik.
Workers can either exit the data or they can be censored by end of sample. Because there is
no attrition for plants, there is no attrition in the worker data. In other words, when a worker
exits the data, it is because his tenure with his employing plant has come to an end. This can
happen for one of two reasons, namely the plant closes or because the worker separates from
the plant. It is a feature of these linked data that we are able to distinguish between these two
events. Of course, a separation can either be a quit or a ﬁre, but we do not observe this.
For example, in Figure 1, Plant 1 employs 5 workers on 30/6/2000. Three of these workers
(i = 1,4,5) separate from the plant during the sample period. The two remaining workers
leave the plant because the plant closes. As with the plant, the variable ai records the elapsed
duration of the worker employed in the plant when she enters the sample, and ai records
completed duration. For workers, however, the relevant durations are the length of time since
joining the plant (tenure) rather than the age of the plant. The dummy variable ci takes the
value 1 if the worker separates from the plant during the sample period and 0 otherwise. Note
that the completed duration to separation for workers 2 and 3 in plant 1 is censored because
the plant closes before this event can occur.
Workers may join plants when the plants ﬁrst appear in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik, or they
may be hired afterwards. For example, in Figure 1, workers 1 and 2 in plant 1 join the plant
when it is born, while workers 3, 4 and 5 are hired later.6
TABLE 2 HERE
Table 2 shows that 517,909 workers exited the data; of these, 474,749 workers separated
from their plants (quits or ﬁres) and 43,160 workers exited because their plant closed. In
other words, 8.3% of exits are because of plant closure. It is the hazard to separation that we
seek to model. Given 474,749 worker separations, when divided by 3,950,506 worker-years
at risk, the raw worker hazard to separating is 0.1202. Similarly, the raw worker hazard to
plant closure is 0.0109. 758,556 workers entered the panel: 328,028 of them were hired and
the worker’s plant entering the panel accounts for the rest. This gives a worker hiring rate
6Note that whether or not workers are hired before 30/6/2000 makes no difference to their elapsed duration
when they are ﬁrst observed in a plant because we observe their tenure from the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik. Worker
2 in plant 2 joins the plant after 30/6/2000and ﬁrst appears in the data in 2001 with a=1. Worker 3 in plant joins
the plant just before 30/6/2000, but still has a=1 in 2000.
9of 328,028/(3,950,506−570,949) or 0.0971.7 This suggests that the sample period is one of
contraction amongst existing ﬁrms in the West German labour market. Note that there we
observe 1,329,505 workers, ie the 758,556 workers observed on 30/6/2000 and the 570,949
workers who enter afterwards.
4 Methods
Plant hazards
We wish to model the probability that a plant closes as a function of its age (elapsed duration)
and whether it is foreign-owned. Our data comprise a panel of plants j = 1,...,Jt observed
annually on 30 June for t = 2000...2004. The appropriate econometric framework is that
of discrete-time duration models, because a plant may close at any point between 1st July
in year t and 30th June in year t + 1, but we do not observe the precise date on which this
happens.
The fundamental concept relating plant age to closure is the hazard function. This has been
used both in the general analysis of plant closure (Audretsch & Mahmood 1995) and in the
analysis of foreign ownership on plant closure (G¨ org & Strobl 2003). The hazard for plant
j, hja, is deﬁned as the probability that a plant closes at some point between age (elapsed
duration) a − 1 and a, conditional on having survived to age a − 1:
hja = Pr(a − 1 < Aj ≤ a | Aj > a − 1) a = 1,2,...
where Aj is the latent age of the plant j. Recall that we denote the completed duration for
plantj asaj. Alsorecall thatformostplantsin thesamplewehavedelayedentry (i.e.aj > 1).
Our econometric methods need to take account of this delayed entry. We also need to deal
with the morecommon problem that thesample ends before all plants close (right-censoring).
Standard references are Wooldridge (2002), Cameron & Trivedi (2005) and Jenkins (2005).
It is Jenkins that we use here.
To start, consider the standard case where all plants are observed from birth, but for some
plants there is right censoring. The log-likelihoodfunction for plant j is given by (see Jenkins
7N2000 = 570,949 is excluded from the numerator because it is not part of the risk set. This is because we








(1 − hjk) (1)
Recall that the indicator variable cj = 1 if a plant closes and zero otherwise. The likelihood
for a plant which closes at age aj is (1 − hj1)(1 − hj2)...(1 − hj,aj−1)hjaj, whereas the
likelihood for a plant which does not close at age aj is (1 − hj1)(1 − hj2)...(1 − hjaj).
(Suppose we observed Plant 1 from birth in Figure 2, then L1 = (1 − h11)(1 − h12)(1 −
h13)(1 − h14)(1 − h15)h16.)
A standard approach for estimating this model is to expand the data so that each plant con-
tributes aj rows. Deﬁne a binary indicator variable yjk which equals one if plant j closes at
age k and zero otherwise. If cj = 1 then yik = 1 in the last row k = aj and zero in all other
rows. If cj = 0 then yik equals zero in all rows. (If Plant 1 were observed from birth, it would





[yjk loghjk + (1 − yjk)log(1 − hjk)].
This is the likelihood for a binary dependent variable, and models can be estimated using
standard software. To model the effect of covariates on the hazard rate, it is usual to adopt
the proportional hazards assumption. Deﬁne a vector of covariates xjk which characterise
each plant. xjk includes a measure of foreign ownership. It also includes some worker-level
covariates that have been averaged to the plant-level. Under the proportional hazards assump-
tion, the precise form of the hazard is given by the complementary log-log link function:
hjk = 1 − exp(−exp(x
0
jkβ + γk)) k = 1,...,ak.
The γk terms are interpreted as the log of a non-parametric piecewise linear baseline hazard.
The notation x0
jk explicitly acknowledges that the covariates may vary with elapsed duration
or calendar time.
We now deal with the problem of late entry. As noted, most plants in our sample have aj > 1
and so have already been at risk of closing for some time, depending on their age. The
implication of this is that one is more likely to observe long rather than short durations. This
is a classic sample selection problem. To deal with this, the likelihood needs amending. The




jaj(1 − hjaj)(1−cj) Qaj−1
k=1 (1 − hjk)
Sj(aj − 1)
This is the likelihood given in Equation (1), but also conditions on survival up to age aj − 1,
where aj is the age at which plant j enters the data. But the denominator can be written as
















[yjk loghjk + (1 − yjk)log(1 − hjk)]. (2)
This is very similar to the standard expression, except that the summation runs from the age
of the plant when it enters the data. (Because Plant 1 survived until 30/6/2006, its likelihood
contribution is L1 = (1 − h13)(1 − h14)(1 − h15)h16 and y1k = {0,0,0,1}.)
Worker hazards
Thegreat advantageoflinkedemployer-employeedataisthatwecan also observeseparations
at the employee level, as well as plant closure. This is important because separations occur
even when plants do not close. As noted in Section 2, various theories suggest that foreign-
owned plants might have higher (or lower) labour turnover as well as differential closure
rates. We deﬁne a worker separation to occur when worker i leaves plant j, but plant j does
not close.
The appropriate econometric framework for worker separations is one which relates the prob-
ability of separating from plant j to elapsed time in that plant, or the worker’s tenure. Thus,
the econometric model is almost the same as that used for plant closure, except that elapsed
and completed durations are measured by tenure rather than plant age. As already discussed
12(see also Figure 1), one important additional feature is that the duration to separation can
be censored by two possible events. As with plants, the ﬁrst censoring event is the end of
the sample period. The second censoring event for workers is that plants may close before a
separation can occur.
Workers’ tenure is not zero when a plant enters the datafor mostworkers, because they joined
their plant earlier. Thus we also have late entry in the worker data, as well as a standard case
where the worker is hired by the plant after the plant enters the sample. The likelihood devel-
oped earlier for plants applies to both types of worker. To estimate the hazard to separation




[yik loghik + (1 − yik)log(1 − hik)]
where ai is worker i’s elapsed tenure when the plant is ﬁrst observed, ai is his completed
tenure at the time of separation (or the end of the sample), yik is the dummy indicating sepa-
ration in row k and hik is the corresponding hazard function:
hik = 1 − exp(−exp(x
0
ikβ + γk)) k = 1,...,ak.
x0
ik denotes worker covariates, which can vary by elapsed duration and/or calendar time, and
can also contain plant-level information.
In principle, one could also model the duration until plant closure using the worker-level data.
In the context of Figure 1, we could use the eight workers to estimate the hazard to plant
closure. Two workers experience plant closure, while the other six workers have durations
censored either by the end of the sample period, or by separating before the plant closes.
However, itdoes not makesenseto modeltheduration to plantclosureas afunction ofworker
tenure. The appropriate measure of duration is plant age. Using plant age in a worker-level
duration model, however, is just a re-weighting of the plant-level duration model.
5 Results
5.1 Foreign ownership and plant closure
In Figure 3 we plot estimates of the hazard to plant closure. The raw data is plotted in panel
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Figure 3: Plant closure hazards
number of plant closures occur in each band. The solid line gives the hazard rate for domestic
plants.8 As with the existing literature, surveyed in Section 2, the raw hazard to closing for a
domestic plant declines with its age, falling from about 0.08 in the ﬁrst two years to less than
0.04 after 20 years. (This is consistent with the raw hazard of 0.044 noted above, because the
plant-age distribution is skewed in favour of older plants.) This result may occur because of
selection effects, or because plants’ productivities genuinely improve over time.
The dashed line in panel (a) shows the equivalent raw closure hazard for foreign-owned
plants. A test of the equality of the two hazard rates cannot be rejected (χ2(8) = 2.54, p-
value 0.96), so in the raw data there is no signiﬁcant difference in the closure rates of the
domestic and foreign plants.
8Throughout, all plant-level analyses are based on 31,555 plant-years and 8,947 plants. See Table 1. Simi-
larly, we use 3,950,506 worker-years and 1,329,505 workers. See Table 2.
14Theestimationmethods described in Section 4 rely on the proportionalhazards assumptionto
model the effect of any covariate, such as foreign ownership. This restriction might be unwar-
ranted if the effect of ownership on closure probability varies with plant age. For example,
the initially high closure probability of domestic plants might be because they have not had
time to learn about the most productive production methods. A foreign-owned plant which is
part of a larger multinational might be given access to more productive techniques initially,
in which case its closure probability would be lower initially. This advantage might diminish
with plant age, in which case the difference in closure hazards of foreign and domestic plants
would not be proportional.
However, the proportional hazards assumption imposed in panel (b) of Figure 3 cannot be
rejected (χ2(7) = 2.34, p-value 0.94). The estimated “foreign ownership effect” in panel (b)
is just −0.052 with a standard error of 0.097. As well as being statistically insigniﬁcant, this
is a qualitatively small effect, as can be seen in panel (b).9
We now consider what happens to the hazard rates for foreign and domestic plants when
we control for their observable characteristics. The regressors included in the vector xjk are
summarised in Table 3 and 4. Note that because we have linked employer-employee data, we
are able to include the average characteristics of a plant’s workforce as well as characteristics
of the plant itself.
TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE
Table3 showsthat foreign-owned plantsare morethan twice as large, on average, as domestic
plants. They are much morelikely to operate a works council,10 are morelikely to export their
output, more likely to be part of a larger ﬁrm and more likely to engage in sectoral and ﬁrm-
level bargaining. They have higher levels of investment and they are more likely to report
“very good” proﬁts.11 They are more likely to be located in the centre of large urban areas,
and are more likely to be in the producer goods and investment goods industries.
Table4showsthatworkers inforeign-ownedplantshaveslightlylowertenure, aremorelikely
to be male and less likely to be an apprentice. As is well known, they are paid higher wages,12
9It should be emphasised that −0.052 is the difference in log-hazard rates between domestic and foreign
plants and can be interpreted as an approximate percentage difference in the usual way.
10This is closely linked to their larger size: see Addison, Schnabel & Wagner (2001) for a description and
analysis of German works councils.
11The proﬁtability variable comes from the question “How was the proﬁt situation in the last business year?”
12Andrews, Bellmann, Schank & Upward (2007) analyse the wage effects of foreign ownership using these
data.
15they have higher qualiﬁcation levels and they are more likely to be managers, engineers but
also in basic manual occupations.
So, the fact that the raw closure hazards in panels (a) and (b) are very similar could be mis-
leading. Including a detailed set of plant- and worker-characteristics, using Equation (2),
gives us the hazards plotted in panels (c) and (d). The result is to shift up the hazard of
foreign-owned plants up relative to domestic plants. After imposing proportional hazards the
foreign-ownership effect is estimated to be 0.106, but with a standard error of 0.106. We can-
not reject the proportional hazards assumption, so panel (d) represents our preferred model.
We label this as our base model; full estimates are reported in Table 5.
The other striking effect of including xjk is that the hazard becomes much ﬂatter: compare
panel (d) with panel (b), for example. This strongly suggests that the apparent negative du-
ration dependence observed in the raw hazard is primarily a selection effect. Suppose that
each plant actually faces a constant risk of closure which does not change with a plant’s age.
One could think of this as a productivity shock which arrives at each plant in each period
with constant mean and variance. However, some plants have a higher (ﬁxed) productivity
advantage which means that they can withstand greater negative shocks to their productivity.
Plants with higher ﬁxed productivities will therefore survive for longer, on average. The av-
erage productivity of the sample will therefore increase as elapsed age increases, leading to
the apparent downward-sloping hazard shown in panel (b). If our observable characteristics
are a good proxy for productivity, then their inclusion will make the hazard ﬂatter.
TABLE 5 HERE
Consider now the estimates for all the other covariates, reported in Table 5. Recall that this
is an estimate of a hazard to closing, so a positive coefﬁcient means that that characteristic
is associated with a greater risk of plant failure. Estimates on dummy variables should be
interpreted as a proportional shift in the hazard (as with foreign ownership above); if logged,
estimates on continuously measured covariates should be interpreted as elasticities. The haz-
ard to a plant closing is declining in ﬁrm size and proﬁtability, but is higher for plants with a
works council.13 The effect of plant-size is large. Small plants have double the closure rate
of medium-sized plants [100(e−0.344+1.103 − 1) = 113.6%], whereas very large plants have a
closure rate 65.1% lower than medium-sized plants [100(e−2.155+1.103 − 1)].
13See Addison, Bellman & K¨ olling (2004) for evidence that works councils and plant closings are positively
associated.
16Worker characteristics generally seem less important, but two results stand out. First, there is
a signiﬁcant non-linear relationship between plant closure and average wages. The estimated
turning point is within the range of the data, but below the mean. A one standard deviation in
average log wages increases the closure hazard by about 0.2, so for most plants an increase in
wages is associated with an increase in the closure probability. If we believe that plants with
higherunobservedproductivitywillbelesslikelytocloseandmorelikelytopayhigherwages
for its workers then this coefﬁcient is actually biased downwards. However, disentanglingthe
causal effect of wages on plant closure is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, there is
a signiﬁcant relationship between plant closure and average tenure which is negative within
the range of the data. A one standard deviation increase in the average tenure of a plant’s
workforce reduces its closure hazard by about 0.3.
In Table 6 we summarise the estimated coefﬁcient on foreign ownership for a variety of
speciﬁcations. As already noted, the raw effect is negative and insigniﬁcantly different from
zero; this becomes positive(but still small and insigniﬁcant) when controlling for a full set of
plant and worker characteristics.
TABLE 6 HERE
Oneissuewhich arises when estimatingeffects at theplant levelis whether one shouldweight
by plant size. This is important because the size distribution of plants is so skewed. Plants
with more than 500 workers, for example, account for more than 60% of all worker-years in
the data, but account for only 7% of plant-years. Therefore if the effect of foreign ownership
varies with plant size, weighting could substantially alter our conclusions about the effect of
foreignownershiponthelabourmarket. InFigure4weplottheestimatedcoefﬁcient, together
with standard error bars, for four samples split by plant size. Figure 4 reveals that small
foreign-owned plants are signiﬁcantly more likely to close than small domestic ﬁrms, while
the effect for the three other size groups is poorly determined and rather small. Weighting by
plant size (reported in Table 6) increases the estimated foreign ownership effect substantially,
but the effect is still insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
A key ﬁnding of Alvarez & G¨ org (2005) is that foreign-owned plants are only more “foot-
loose” if their production is oriented towards domestic markets. In Figure 5 we plot the
probability of plant closure against the export intensity of the plant. As our results in Table 5
showed, exporting plants are less likely to close, but there appears to be a higher closure
















































  1−19 20−99 100−499 500+  
Plant size
Figure 4: The effect of foreign ownership on plant closure by plant size
ownership dummy with the exporting dummy. The results, also shown in Table 6 conﬁrm Al-
varez&G¨ org’s ﬁnding, butforGermany. Foreign-ownedexportingplantshavea signiﬁcantly







































Figure 5: Plant closure and exports
185.2 Foreign ownership and worker separations
Even if foreign-owned plants do not have higher closure rates, it is still possible that they
contribute to greater employment insecurity by having greater turnover of workers. In this
section we therefore examine the separation rates of workers. Note that separation which
occur because of plant closure are treated as censoring (see Section 4). However, with these
administrative data we cannot distinguish separations which are initiated by the employer
(“layoffs”) from separations which are initiated by the worker (“quits”).
Figure 6 draws the estimated hazards for worker separations using the same four speciﬁca-
tions used for the plant closure hazards.14 Panel (a) plots the raw hazard of separating for
workers in foreign- and domestically-owned plants. As is well known, the separation hazard
exhibits negative duration dependence. A number of theories are consistent with this ﬁnding.
As with the plant hazards, these theories suggest either that the downward sloping hazard is
the result of selection, or the result of genuine changes in the probability of separation over
elapsed time.
Matching models, for example, suggest that good matches between workers and ﬁrms are
likely to endure, while bad matches are likely to end early. Thus, as tenure increases, the
sample of remaining matches tends to improve, and the average separation rate of the remain-
ing matches falls.
Human capital models, on the other hand, suggest that workers accumulate ﬁrm-speciﬁc hu-
man capital which increases their marginal product as tenure accumulates. If their wage
increases by less than their marginal product, both the worker and the ﬁrm will have more
incentive to maintain the employment relationship, and the separation rate will fall.
The hazard for workers in foreign-owned plants is below that for workers in domestically-
owned plants for every tenure band except for one. Although the two hazards are not very far
apart, the large sample size means we can easily reject the null that the hazard rates are equal
(χ2(7) = 1239.56, p-value < 0.001). In addition, we can also reject the null that the differ-
ence between the two hazards is a constant proportion (χ2(6) = 512.60, p-value < 0.001).
However, the resulting hazard after imposing the proportional hazards assumption, plotted in
panel (b), look reasonably similar to those in panel (a). The average foreign ownership effect
is estimated to be −0.1 with a standard error of 0.004. Although this is highly signiﬁcant, it
is still quite a small effect, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 6.
14In fact, the much greater number of observations at the worker level implies that we do not have to group
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Figure 6: Worker separation hazards
In panel (c) we estimate the hazard after controlling for a full set of covariates, which are
essentially the same as those used in the plant closure hazards. Interestingly, the effect of
including covariates in the worker separation model is very similar to the effect of including
covariates in the plant closure model. The hazard for workers in foreign-owned plants shifts
up relative to the hazard for worker in domestically-owned plants. However, in contrast to
the plant closure results, the introduction of covariates does not make the hazard “ﬂatter”, as
would be expected if the shape of the hazard were drive entirely by selection effects.
In panel (d) we impose the proportional hazards assumption, which is again easily rejected
(χ2(6) = 493.78, p-value < 0.001). The estimated foreign ownership effect jumps from
−0.102 (panel b) to 0.036 (panel d) when we include covariates. In other words, once we
control for the differences in observable characteristics between workers in foreign and do-
mestic plants, workers in foreign plants actually have higher separation rates. However, once
20again the size of the effect is very small.
TABLE 7 HERE
The results of the proportional hazard base model are reported in Table 7. The separation rate
is non-linear in ﬁrm size: very small and very large ﬁrms appear to have the lowest separation
rates. Separations are decreasing in proﬁtability: plants with “bad” proﬁts have a separation
hazard about 0.2 higher than plants with “very good” proﬁts (the base group). The separation
hazard is also non-linear in plant age (in contrast to the plant closure hazard). The separation
hazard is lowest for young plants and plants aged over 20 years. Plants which have a works
council, which export, and which are not part of a larger ﬁrm have a lower separation hazard.
A summary of the foreign ownership effect is reported in Table 8. In the raw data foreign-
owned ﬁrms have lower separation rates, but once we control for covariates this becomes
small and positive. Because of the strong interaction effect of exporting and foreign owner-
ship in the plant closure hazards, we repeated this exercise for worker separations. We ﬁnd
a very similar result: foreign plants which do not export have signiﬁcantly higher separation
rates than either domestic plants or foreign plants which do export.
TABLE 8 HERE
6 Conclusions
A number of empirical studies, and some theory, has suggested that multinational ﬁrms may
contribute to job insecurity, either because they are more “footloose” than domestic produc-
ers, or because they can adjust their employment more rapidly. In contrast, other theories
have proposed that foreign producers may actually wish to have lower worker turnover in
order to prevent the loss of skilled workers.
Using a large linked employer-employee dataset we are able to investigate these issues em-
pirically. These data allow us to measure whether foreign ownership affects the probability of
plant closure, and whether workers in foreign-owned plants have greater separation rates. In
contrast to previous studies in this area, our econometric methodology accounts for a discrete
measure of duration, and for the fact that we have left-censoring.
We ﬁnd that foreign-owned plants actually have slightly lower hazards to closure, but the
difference between foreign and domestic plants is not statistically signiﬁcant. Controlling for
21a wide range of plant- and worker-level characteristics reverses the result, so that foreign-
owned plants have slightly higher hazards. But again the effect is insigniﬁcant. We are also
able to show that certain characteristics of the workforce can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the survival of a plant. In particular, plants with a more experienced workforce have
signiﬁcantly lower closure hazards.
We then examine the separation rates of workers in the same sample of plants. Our results
are very similar to the plant closure results. In the raw data, foreign-owned plants have lower
separationrates, butonce wecontrolforobservablecharacteristics thisconclusionis reversed.
Finally, we should note that the “foreign-ownership effect” does not appear to be constant
across different types of plants. In particular, foreign-owned plants which are small and
which do not export their output have signiﬁcantly higher closure rates and worker separation
rates. Overall, however, our results do not support the claim that the actions of foreign-owned
companies are signiﬁcantly changing the stability of employment.
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247 Tables
Table 1: Plant entry and exit*
Year No. of plants Plants exiting Plants entering
Jt on 30 June Ot,t+1 It−1,t
2000 4,209 129 —
2001 5,627 238 1,547
2002 6,636 323 1,247
2003 7,477 351 1,164
2004 7,906 358 780
total 31,855 1,399 4,738
* The table displays the standardstock-ﬂowidentity: Jt =
Jt−1 + It−1,t − Ot−1,t. Plants who exit are genuinely
those that close (thereis no attritionin these data); plants
who enter are left-censored.
Table 2: Worker entry and exit*
Year No. of workers No. of workers exiting No. of workers joining
Nt on 30 June ot,t+1, because it−1,t, because
ﬁrm worker ﬁrm worker
closes separates joins hired
sample
2000 570,949 2,987 70,845
2001 764,126 10,678 105,131 176,474 90,535
2002 826,432 10,107 92,311 93,867 84,248
2003 853,446 8,966 92,927 49,645 79,787
2004 935,553 10,422 113,535 110,542 73,458
total 3,950,506 43,160 474,749 430,528 328,028
* Thetabledisplaysthestandardstock-ﬂowidentity: Nt = Nt−1+it−1,t−ot−1,t.
25Table 3: Means for plant-level covariatesa
Domestic Foreign
Firm age (years) 15.896 14.854∗∗
Firm size (number of workers) 127.481 343.656∗∗
Plant size bigger than initial sizec 0.776 0.673∗∗
Works council 0.300 0.642∗∗
Firm exports 0.292 0.617∗∗
Plant not part of larger ﬁrm 0.752 0.339∗∗
Sectoral bargaining agreement 0.521 0.562∗∗
Firm-level bargaining agreement 0.050 0.079∗∗
Investment (relative to median) 46.525 136.535∗∗
Proﬁts “very good” 0.054 0.089∗∗
Proﬁts “good” 0.276 0.287
Proﬁts “Satisfactory” 0.335 0.321
Proﬁts “Just sufﬁcient” 0.200 0.166∗∗
Proﬁts “Bad” 0.135 0.138
Population >500,000 (central) 0.359 0.441∗∗
Population >500,000 (outskirts) 0.064 0.056
Population 100,000-500,000(central) 0.186 0.175
Population 100,000-500,000(outskirts) 0.116 0.098
Population 50,000-100,000(central) 0.018 0.015
Population 50,000-100,000(outskirts) 0.048 0.046
Population 20,000-50,000 0.094 0.086
Population 5,000-20,000 0.078 0.068
Population 2,000-5,000 0.022 0.013
Population <2,000 0.016 0.003∗∗
Mining, energy 0.016 0.015
Food 0.042 0.030
Consumer goods 0.058 0.053
Producer goods 0.082 0.179∗∗
Investment goods 0.140 0.236∗∗
Construction 0.139 0.033∗∗
Trade 0.210 0.195
Transport & communications 0.058 0.056
Catering 0.037 0.056∗∗
Business services 0.181 0.125∗∗
Other services 0.038 0.024∗
Local unemployment rated 8.796 8.504∗∗
Herﬁndahl 3-digit concentration indexe 0.004 0.008∗∗
Industry employment growth in previous year −0.001 0.012∗∗
a Table shows means pooled across 2000–2004. These are the means
of the variable when the plant entered the sample, ie one observation
per plant. There are 8,947 plants (8,192 domestic and 755 foreign-
owned).
b Asterisks indicates the signiﬁcance of a t-test of the difference in the
means; ∗ is signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗ is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
c Initial size is based on the employment of the plant in the ﬁrst year in
which it appears in the Besch¨ aftigtenstatistik
d Unemployment rate varies at the three-digit Kreis level, an interme-
diate level of administrationbetween the L¨ ander (German states) and
the local/municipal levels (Gemeinden).
e The concentration index is based on employment.
26Table 4: Means for individual-level covariatesa
Domestic Foreign




Part-time worker 0.082 0.050
Home worker 0.001 0.000
Daily wage e 80.854 93.376
Age 36.050 36.352
Without apprenticeship or Abitur 0.215 0.201
Apprenticeship, no Abitur 0.541 0.522
No apprenticeship, with Abitur 0.027 0.031
With apprenticeship and Abitur 0.037 0.046
Technical college degree 0.049 0.065
University education 0.047 0.078
Education unknown 0.084 0.057
Basic manual occupation 0.272 0.341
Qualiﬁed manual occupation 0.197 0.152
Engineers and technicians 0.128 0.152
Basic service occupation 0.122 0.074
Qualiﬁed service occupation 0.009 0.003
Semi-professional 0.004 0.003
Professional 0.008 0.007
Basic business occupation 0.062 0.060
Qualiﬁed business occupation 0.176 0.174
Manager 0.021 0.034
a Table shows means pooled across 2000–2004. These
are the means of the variable when the worker entered
the sample, ie one observation per worker. There are
1,329,505 workers (1,067,691 in domestic plants and
261,814 in foreign-ownedplants).
b All means are signiﬁcantly different at the 5% level.
27Table 5: Plant-level closure hazard, base model
Coeff. Std. Err.
Plant is foreign-owned 0.106 (0.106)
Works council 0.354 (0.086)∗∗
Plant exports −0.063 (0.073)
Plant is not part of a larger ﬁrm 0.012 (0.073)
Sectoral bargaining agreement −0.041 (0.067)
Firm-level bargaining agreement −0.395 (0.156)∗∗
Investment (relative to median)b 0.637 (1.677)
5–9 workers −0.344 (0.096)∗∗
10–19 workers −0.478 (0.100)∗∗
20–49 workers −0.551 (0.101)∗∗
50–99 workers −0.742 (0.126)∗∗
100–199 workers −1.103 (0.151)∗∗
200–499 workers −1.259 (0.165)∗∗
500–999 workers −1.539 (0.249)∗∗
≥ 1000 workers −2.155 (0.367)∗∗
Plant size bigger than initial size −0.347 (0.065)∗∗
Proﬁts “good” −0.083 (0.147)
Proﬁts “satisfactory” 0.207 (0.144)
Proﬁts “just sufﬁcient” 0.544 (0.146)∗∗
Proﬁts “bad” 1.039 (0.148)∗∗
Local unemployment rate 0.028 (0.010)∗∗
Industry concentration index −1.557 (3.147)
Industry employment growth rate 1.445 (0.615)∗∗
Proportion of non-German workers 0.036 (0.172)
Proportion of females −0.151 (0.113)
log average wage −2.843 (0.911)∗∗
(log average wage)2 0.394 (0.115)∗∗
Average age 0.026 (0.167)
Average age2/100 −0.096 (0.407)
Average age3/10000 0.146 (0.323)
Proportion with apprenticeship, no Abitur −0.185 (0.155)
Proportion with no apprenticeship, with Abitur −0.816 (0.825)
Proportion with apprenticeship and Abitur −0.803 (0.335)∗∗
Proportion with technical college degree −0.498 (0.422)
Proportion with university education 0.037 (0.292)
Proportion with education unknown −0.145 (0.158)
Average tenure −0.125 (0.023)∗∗
Average tenure2/100 0.415 (0.101)∗∗
a Regressions also include dummies for location, industry, year and
occupation.
b Coefﬁcients are ×10−4.
28Table 6: Summary of plant-level hazard
models
Coeff. Std. Err.
Raw effect −0.052 (0.097)
Including xjk (Table 5) 0.106 (0.106)
Weighted by plant size 0.367 (0.257)
Interaction model:
Foreign ownership 0.344 (0.138)
Exporting −0.010 (0.076)
Foreign owned and exporting −0.485 (0.201)
29Table 7: Worker-level separation hazard, base
model
Coeff. Std. Err.
Plant is foreign owned 0.034 (0.004)∗∗
Works council −0.100 (0.005)∗∗
Plant exports −0.142 (0.004)∗∗
Plant is not part of a larger ﬁrm −0.045 (0.003)∗∗
Sectoral bargaining agreement 0.011 (0.005)∗∗
Firm-level bargaining agreement 0.006 (0.007)
Investment (relative to median)b −0.246 (0.008)∗∗
5–9 workers 0.056 (0.034)∗
10–19 workers 0.111 (0.031)∗∗
20–49 workers 0.078 (0.030)∗∗
50–99 workers 0.154 (0.030)∗∗
100–199 workers 0.169 (0.030)∗∗
200–499 workers 0.163 (0.030)∗∗
500–999 workers 0.088 (0.030)∗∗
≥ 1000 workers 0.046 (0.030)
Proﬁts “good” −0.010 (0.006)∗
Proﬁts “satisfactory” 0.069 (0.006)∗∗
Proﬁts “just sufﬁcient” 0.178 (0.006)∗∗
Proﬁts “bad” 0.193 (0.007)∗∗
Firm age (years) 0.037 (0.001)∗∗
Firm age2 −0.117 (0.004)∗∗
Non-German worker 0.066 (0.005)∗∗
Female −0.002 (0.004)
Log wage −0.151 (0.013)∗∗




Apprenticeship, no Abitur −0.008 (0.006)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur −0.113 (0.006)∗∗
Apprenticeship, with Abitur 0.220 (0.009)∗∗
Technical college degree 0.017 (0.009)∗
University education 0.059 (0.009)∗∗
Education unknown 0.154 (0.009)∗∗
a Regressions also include dummies for location, indus-
try, year and occupation.
b Coefﬁcients are ×10−4.
30Table 8: Summary of worker-level hazard
models
Coeff. Std. Err.
Raw effect (Table 7) −0.102 (0.004)
Including xik 0.036 (0.004)
Interaction model:
Foreign ownership 0.110 (0.007)
Exporting −0.117 (0.004)
Foreign owned and exporting −0.117 (0.008)
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